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NOTES
PRIOR CONVICTIONS OFFERED FOR IMPEACHMENT IN
CIVIL TRIALS: THE INTERACTION OF FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE 609(a) AND 403
INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) admits evidence of a witness' prior
convictions for felonies other than those involving dishonesty, for im-
peachment purposes only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect to the defendant.2 The qualifier "to the defendant"
has created considerable confusion in civil cases.3 Courts disagree on
1. Crimes involving dishonesty, commonly referred to as crimen falsi, involve some
element of deceit, untruthfulness or falsification bearing on a witness' credibility. Exactly
which crimes fall under this definition is subject to disagreement. See 3 J. Weinstein &
M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 609[04], at 609-71 (1982).
2. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a) provides:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from
him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the
crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the proba-
tive value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the de-
fendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
3. Courts and commentators have taken several positions on the proper application
of Rule 609(a)(1). The first line of cases applies the balancing test of Rule 609(a) to all
witnesses in both criminal and civil proceedings with no discussion of the possible appli-
cation of Rule 403. See, e.g., Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 894-95 (7th Cir.) (af-
firming civil trial court's exclusion of plaintiff's manslaughter conviction that had been
offered by defendants to impeach credibility), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983); Howard
v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1981) (civil trial court's exclusion of plaintiff's
felony theft conviction affirmed as within trial court's "broad discretion under Rule
609(a)(1)"); Calhoun v. Baylor, 646 F.2d 1158, 1163 (6th Cir. 1981) (admission of de-
fendant's prior felony conviction for impeachment purposes in civil case affirmed). Inter-
estingly, when these courts paraphrase Rule 609(a), they almost always omit the words
"to the defendant" in the balancing process. See, e.g., Lenard, 699 F.2d at 895; Howard,
658 F.2d at 359; Calhoun, 646 F.2d at 1163. This approach now seems outdated. The
Fifth Circuit has since reconsidered the issue and reached a different result. Shows v. M/
V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1983) (Rule 403 applicable in all cases). The
Seventh Circuit has recognized the issue, but expressly refused to decide it. Christmas v.
Sanders, 759 F.2d 1284, 1289-93 (7th Cir. 1985).
The second line of cases applies Rule 403 in all civil cases regardless of how the balanc-
ing process of Rule 609 is interpreted. See, e.g., Radtke v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 707 F.2d
999, 1000 (8th Cir. 1983); Czajka v. Hickman, 703 F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir. 1983); Shows
v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1983). These cases expressly avoided
deciding whether the balancing provision of Rule 609(a)(1) applies only to criminal de-
fendants because exclusion was always possible under the less exclusionary balancing of
Rule 403. See, eg., Czajka, 703 F.2d at 319; Shows, 695 F.2d at 119.
A third position taken is that the balancing provision of Rule 609(a)(1) applies only to
criminal defendants, and so does not preempt Rule 403 when prior convictions are of-
fered to impeach other types of witnesses. See Moore v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F.
Supp. 919, 921-22 (D. Md. 1983); Tussel v. Witco Chem. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979, 982-85
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whether the balancing provision of Rule 609(a) was intended to apply to
prior conviction impeachment evidence in civil cases.4 Courts that hold
it applies in civil cases disagree on whether the Rule 609(a) balancing
provision applies only to the defendant or to both parties.5 Courts also
disagree on whether, in civil cases, Rule 609(a)(1)'s balancing provision
preempts the more general balance of Federal Rule of Evidence 4036
with respect to unfair prejudice.7
(W.D. Pa. 1983), superseded by Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 578-83 (3rd Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2157 (1985).
The Third Circuit has reached a fourth position on this issue. See Diggs v. Lyons, 741
F.2d 577, 578-82 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2157 (1985). The Third Circuit
held that despite the deficiencies of Rule 609(a), its legislative history and plain language
requires that prior convictions offered for impeachment purposes be automatically admit-
ted against civil plaintiffs. See Diggs, 741 F.2d at 579-82. Rule 403 cannot be applied to
prior convictions offered for impeachment purposes, because it is preempted by the more
specific Rule 609(a). See id. at 578-82. Whether prior convictions are also automatically
admissible against civil defendants was not resolved. See id.
A related line of cases held that the balancing provision of Rule 609(a)(1) applies only
to criminal defendants, and that prior conviction evidence is automatically admitted to
impeach all witnesses in civil cases. See, e.g., Garnett v. Kepner, 541 F. Supp. 241, 244-
45 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (Rule 403 was not applied on the ground that it is preempted by Rule
609(a)), superseded by Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2157 (1985); Ball v. Woods, 402 F. Supp. 803, 811 n.19 (N.D. Ala. 1975) (dictum)
(recall that Shows is now controlling in the Fifth Circuit and that Alabama became part
of the Eleventh Circuit in 1981), aff'd mem. sub. nom. Ball v. Shamblin, 529 F.2d 520
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976); see also 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal
Evidence § 316, at 324 (1979); C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 43, at 94 (3d
ed. 1984).
Another case states that the phrase "to the defendant" in Rule 609(a) refers to the
witness to be impeached, as he was the defendant in the prior criminal case in which he
was convicted. As such, the balancing provision of Rule 609(a) is applicable to all wit-
nesses. Green v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express Inc., No. 85-1368 (E. D. Pa. Dec. 9,
1985) (available Dec. 10, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (dictum).
4. Compare Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 894-95 (7th Cir.) (balancing provision
of Rule 609(a)(1) used to exclude evidence of plaintiff witness' manslaugher conviction),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983) and Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 119 (5th
Cir. 1983) (expressly avoids deciding whether Rule 609(a)(1) balancing provision applies
in civil case) with Moore v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919, 921 (D. Md. 1983)
(Rule 609(a)(1) balancing provision applies only in criminal cases) and C. McCormick,
supra note 3, § 43, at 94 (same).
5. Compare Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 894-95 (7th Cir.) (Rule 609(a)(1) bal-
ancing provision applied to exclude prior conviction of civil plaintiff witness), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983) and Calhoun v. Baylor, 646 F.2d 1158, 1163 (6th Cir. 1981)
(Rule 609(a)(1) balancing applies to prior convictions offered to impeach civil defendant)
with Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 578-82 (3d Cir. 1984) (Rule 609(a)(1) balancing pro-
vision not applicable to impeach civil plaintiff; opinion unclear on whether Rule 609(a)(1)
could exclude prior convictions of civil defendant), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2157 (1985).
6. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
7. See Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 581-82 (3d Cir. 1984) (Rule 403 preempted by
Rule 609(a)(1) in impeachment context), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2157 (1985); Shows v.
M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1983) (Rule 403 always applicable); Moore
v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919, 922 (D. Md. 1983) (Rule 403 not preempted
RULE 609(a) AND CIVIL CASES
Part I of this Note reviews the problems inherent in the use of prior
conviction evidence. Part II examines the legislative history of Rule
609(a) and demonstrates that Congress intended the balancing provision
of Rule 609(a) to apply only to prior conviction evidence offered to im-
peach a criminal defendant. Part III discusses the practical aspects of
applying Rule 609(a) in civil cases and the relationship of this Rule to
Rule 403. Part IV considers the proper application of Rule 403 to prior
conviction evidence offered for impeachment in civil cases. This Note
concludes that Rule 609(a)'s balancing test should apply only in criminal
cases, and that the general balancing test of Rule 403 should apply to
prior conviction evidence offered in civil cases.
I. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN IMPEACHMENT THROUGH
PRIOR CONVICTION
In most jurisdictions, a witness' credibility may be impeached by ad-
mitting evidence of the witness' prior convictions for felonies or crimen
falsi8 to give the fact-finder additional information with which to evalu-
ate a witness' testimony.9 This practice rests on the arguably tenuous
theory"0 that prior criminal activity relates to veracity.I
by Rule 609(a) to impeach in civil cases, because Rule 609(a)(1) balancing process applies
only to criminal defendants).
8. See S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 519 (4th ed.
1986).
Until the mid-1800's a person who had been convicted of a felony or any crimen falsi
was automatically disqualified as a witness. 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 986, at 861 (.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970); see also C. McCormick, supra note 3, § 43, at 93 (pre-modem
rule); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, § 609[02], at 609-54 (same). This early
common law rule of automatic disqualification has been changed by statute in virtually
all jurisdictions. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 788 (West 1966); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-145
(1983); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 10-905 (1984); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4513
(McKinney 1963). A witness with a prior criminal history is now competent to testify.
but the opposing party, including a criminal prosecutor, is permitted to impeach the wit-
ness' credibility by admitting evidence of the witness' prior convictions of felonies. See,
e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 788 (West 1966); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-145 (1983); Md. Cts. &
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 10-905 (1984); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4513 (McKinney 1963).
9. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (purpose of
impeachment is not to show accused has bad character), cerL denied, 390 U.S. 1029
(1968). Automatic disqualification of a witness at early common law may have been
justified partly on the ground that it would serve as an additional punishment for the
crime. See 2 J. Wigmore, supra note 8, § 519, at 726.
10. See 10 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 609.13[1], at VI-141 (1985); 3 J. Weinstein &
M. Berger, supra note 1, § 609[02], at 609-55; cf. 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note
3, § 315, at 316-17 ("widely disparate views as to the kinds of convictions which bear
upon truthful disposition").
11. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, § 609[02], at 609-55; see, e.g., 3 D.
Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 3, § 315, at 315-16; 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 416, at 549 (1982); Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeachment Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach to Applying the "Balancing" Provision of Rule
609(a), 31 Syracuse L. Rev. 907, 910 (1980). The relevance of prior criminal activity to
veracity rests on assumptions about psychological truths on which we customarily base
decisions. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, § 609[2], at 609-54 to -55.
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A person's prior history of violence does not necessarily prove he is
untruthful12 and a single act, especially one remote in time or circum-
stance, may be atypical of a witness' character.1 3 Nevertheless, a person
who has committed a crime may have less of a general propensity for
truthfulness than a person with no prior criminal record,14 and is consid-
ered less likely to respect the witness' oath. 5 Although prior conviction
evidence is not conclusive, a jury should be allowed to consider its impact
on the witness' credibility 6 unless it is likely to be unduly prejudicial.
The use of prior conviction evidence, however, has the potential to
create several problems, particularly unfair prejudice,' 7 which exists
when evidence arouses irrational emotions out of proportion to its proba-
tive value.' The jury may misuse this evidence by giving it undue
weight 9 or by using it for a purpose other than evaluation of credibil-
ity.20 A limiting instruction2' is often insufficient to combat improper
use of inflammatory evidence by the jury.22
The potential for undue prejudice is especially disturbing in criminal
12. See 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 3, § 315, at 316-17; J. Weinstein & M.
Berger, supra note 1, § 609[02], at 609-55.
13. See 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, § 609[02], at 609-56.
14. See 2 C. Wright, supra note 11, § 416, at 549.
15. See Mills v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 119, 120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 871
(1977).
16. See Richards v. United States, 192 F.2d 602, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 946 (1952); Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974) (testimony of Rep. Hogan). One court stated:
The object of a trial is not solely to surround an accused with legal safeguards
but also to discover the truth. What a person is often determines whether he
should be believed. When a defendant voluntarily testifies in a criminal case, he
asks the jury to accept his word. No sufficient reason appears why the jury
should not be informed what sort of person is asking them to take his word. In
transactions of everyday life this is probably the first thing that they would wish
to know.
State v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 293, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (1956); see Surratt, supra note 11, at
910-11.
17. See United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 871 (9th Cir. 1980) (any prior conviction
evidence is prejudicial); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, § 609[02), at 609-56 to
-57.
18. See 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, § 609[02], at 609-56 to -57.
19. See Mills v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 119, 120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 871
(1977).
20. See 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 3, § 315, at 316-17; C. McCormick,
supra note 3, § 43, at 99.
21. If asked, the trial judge should instruct the jury that prior convictions should be
considered only in connection with the witness' credibility. See United States v. Lips-
comb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Fed. R. Evid. 105; C. McCormick, supra
note 3, § 59, at 151-52; see also 2 E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and
Instructions § 73.05, at 619-20 (3d ed. 1977) (evidence of prior conviction to be consid-
ered only in evaluating witness' credibility).
22. Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A. J. 1017, 1021 (1965).
We accept much self-deception on this. We say that the evidence of the prior
convictions is admissible only to impeach the defendant's testimony, and not as
evidence of the prior crimes themselves. Juries are solemnly instructed to this
effect. Is there anyone who doubts what the effect of this evidence in fact is on
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cases when the defendant testifies.23 Evidence of a defendant's prior con-
viction may detract from a jury's dispassionate consideration of the evi-
dence.24 The jury may convict the defendant solely because it believes he
is of bad character rather than on the merits of the case.25 Impeachment
of a defense witness by prior convictions raises the possibility of the es-
tablishment of guilt by association.26
The potential for undue prejudice resulting from prior conviction evi-
dence also presents problems in civil cases. If a party or witness associ-
ated with a litigant is impeached by proof of a prior conviction, the jury
may improperly believe the litigant is undeserving of justice.27
A further problem with using prior conviction evidence in both crimi-
nal and civil cases is the deterrent effect that impeachment may have on a
witness' decision to testify.28 The threat of undue prejudice may deter
party witnesses from offering their testimony. 9 Witnesses may refuse to
testify to avoid embarrassing public disclosure of past antisocial behav-
ior.30 The criminal defendant faces a "grievous dilemma.""1 If he stays
off the stand, the jury may believe that he is hiding something and there-
the jury? If we know so clearly what we are actually doing, why do we pretend
that we are not doing what we clearly are doing?
kd; see C. McCormick, supra note 3, § 59, at 151-52. Even with a limiting instruction,
improper use of circumstancial evidence, such as prior convictions, has been cited as one
of the most likely causes of conviction of an innocent person. E. Borchard, Convicting
the Innocent xiv-xvi (1970).
23. See 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 3, § 315, at 317-18; C. McCormick,
supra note 3, § 43, at 99. Criminal defendants who testify are subject to impeachment
just as any other witness. Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 316 (1900); 3A J.
Wigmore, supra note 8, §§ 890-891, at 654-57; 2 C. Wright, supra note 11, § 416, at 559-
61. Evidence of prior convictions of a criminal defendant is especially prejudicial when
the prior crime is similar to the crime charged. See Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d
242, 243-44 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
24. See Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence
A Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 Notre Dame Law. 556, 557 (1984).
25. United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 947 (1969); Richards v. United States, 192 F.2d 602, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 946 (1952); 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 3, § 315, at 317; see
also Mills v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 119, 120 (5th Cir.) (jury will be less reluctant to convict a
person whom they know to have been convicted of other crimes), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
871 (1977).
26. See United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Mills v.
Estelle, 552 F.2d 119, 120 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 871 (1977); 3 D. Louisell & C.
Mueller, supra note 3, § 315, at 318-19; 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1,
§ 609[041, at 609-81.
27. Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1983); 3 D. Louisell & C.
Mueller, supra note 3, § 315, at 317.
28. See 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 3, § 315, at 317-18; see also United
States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1968) (exclusionary rule encourages
criminal defendant, a knowledgeable witness, to take the stand), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
947 (1969).
29. See supra note 28.
30. See Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 13 (1974) (testimony of Rep. Dennis).
31. C. McCormick, supra note 3, § 43, at 99.
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fore presume him guilty. If he testifies, however, he faces the dangers of
impeachment.32 Regardless of the reason, a witness' decision not to tes-
tify is detrimental to the judicial system's interest in finding the truth.33
II. DEVELOPING THE RULE: THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO
IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION AND THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF RULE 609(a)
A. Impeachment by Prior Conviction Prior to Rule 609(a)
Judicial treatment of prior conviction evidence before the adoption of
Rule 609(a) was inadequate. The traditional rule of impeachment by
prior conviction admits evidence of convictions of felonies and crimen
falsi in both civil and criminal cases.34 This rule fails to resolve the
problems inherent in prior conviction impeachment. 35
The approach that first dealt effectively with the problems inherent in
prior conviction impeachment was the balancing test enunciated by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Luck v. United
32. See id. A criminal defendant faces the additional problem of testifying to preserve
his right to appeal the trial court's determination of the admissibility of his prior convic-
tion. See Luce v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 460, 464 (1984).
33. Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
34. See Fed. R. Evid. 609 advisory committee note; see, e.g. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.610
(West 1979); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 10-905 (1984); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law
§ 4513 (McKinney 1963); Va. Code § 19.2-269 (1975). The scope of the evidence admit-
ted under the traditional rule is restricted to the conviction, its time, and place. Note,
Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 Yale L.J. 763, 776
(1961). The witness is often allowed to make a brief denial of guilt. C. McCormick,
supra note 3, § 43, at 99; 4 J. Wigmore, supra note 8, § 1117, at 251 ("a harmless char-
ity"). This approach fails to resolve the problems inherent to impeachment by prior con-
viction. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. Since prior convictions are
automatically admissible, no mechanism enables judges to control the risk of undue prej-
udice and the possibility of an improper verdict. Furthermore, the jury may be denied
the opportunity to hear potentially valuable evidence due to the deterrent effect of poten-
tial impeachment described above. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
Although it is possible to exclude the prior conviction if it is similar to the crime charged,
this is only a partial solution. See infra notes 41, 95 and accompanying text.
Other approaches are much more limiting. One method often proposed is to admit
only prior convictions of crimen falsi. See 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 3,
§ 315, at 319-20. Proponents of this approach argue that convictions other than those for
crimen falsi have no logical relationship to veracity and that their admission too often
results in undue prejudice. Id. This rule, however, is too restrictive. Prior convictions
for offenses other than crimen falsi may also be probative of credibility. See supra notes
11, 14-15 and accompanying text. An absolute restriction keeps probative evidence from
the jury on the assumption that they will always misuse it. It also often allows a witness
to appear to have no prior record when the facts are to the contrary.
Some variations of this rule are even more limiting. The American Law Institute
Model Code of Evidence takes the same view, see Model Code of Evidence Rule 106
(1942), but also excludes any evidence where its probative value is outweighed by the risk
of substantial danger of undue prejudice. Model Code of Evidence Rule 303(b) (1942).
These proposals have not been widely accepted, probably because they may exclude even
prior convictions of crimen falsi, which are generally regarded as relevant to the witness'
credibility. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
35. See supra notes 10-33 and accompanying text.
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States.3 6 Although ultimately rejected by Congress, 7 the Luck approach
significantly influenced the formulation of Rule 609(a). 38 In interpreting
a District of Columbia statute,39 the Luck court held that the judge could
exclude prior conviction evidence when the prejudicial effect of impeach-
ment far outweighed the relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of
credibility." Factors considered in the balance included the nature of
the offense and its relevance to the witness' credibility, the remoteness in
time of the offense and the similarity of the offense to the crime
charged.41
The court placed the burden of proof on the opponent of the evidence
to show reasons warranting exclusion. 2 Admission of such evidence was
favored,43 but exclusion was possible when the cost of admitting the evi-
dence exceeded its benefits." Thus, the problems of undue prejudice and
the deterrent effect on witnesses could be minimized. By 1970, most fed-
eral courts had adopted the Luck approach4" despite arguments that the
36. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
37. See District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act, Pub. L. No.
91-358, § 133, 84 Stat. 473, 550-51 (1970) (prior conviction evidence "may" be admitted
changed to "shall" be admitted, thus mandating admission); see also United States v.
Hairston, 495 F.2d 1046, 1049-51 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (same); 10 J. Moore, supra note 10,
§ 609.01[l.-7], at VI-111.
38. See United States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 941-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); 51
F.R.D. 315, 391, 393 (1971) (second draft of Rule 609(a) based on Luck); 3 D. Louisell &
C. Mueller, supra note 3, § 314, at 287-90.
39. The statute provided, in relevant part:
A person is not incompetent to testify, in either civil or criminal proceedings,
by reason of his having been convicted of [a] crime. The fact of conviction may
be given in evidence to affect his credibility as a witness, either upon the cross-
examination of the witness or by evidence aliunde; and the party cross-examin-
ing him is not bound by his answers as to such matters.
Judiciary & Judicial Procedure Act, § 14-305, Pub. L. No. 88-241, 77 Stat. 478, 519
(1963).
40. Luck, 348 F.2d at 768. Luck and its progeny held that the potential for prejudice
was high with the use of prior conviction evidence, particularly where the conviction is
similar to the crime charged. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968). The Luck majority also recognized the poten-
tial problems created by the deterrent effect of potential impeachment, particularly when
the witness is a criminal defendant. The court held that the cause of truth may be helped
more by letting the jury hear the defendant rather than the defendant foregoing that
opportunity due to fear of prejudice founded on a prior conviction. Luck, 348 F.2d at
768-69; see Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
For an example of a defendant foregoing the opportunity to testify due to fear of undue
prejudice from a prior conviction, see United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270, 272 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 947 (1969).
41. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1029 (1968); see Luck, 348 F.2d at 769.
42. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939-40 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
43. See id. at 939.
44. Il See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
45. See Note, Impeachment by Prior Conviction: Adjusting to Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 609, 64 Cornell L. Rev. 416, 418 (1979).
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Luck test excluded probative evidence46 and that there were no meaning-
ful criteria to guide the trial court's exercise of discretion.47 In the face
of heavy opposition to Luck,48 Congress amended the District of Colum-
bia statute in 1970 to mandate impeachment by prior conviction.49
B. Legislative History of Rule 609(a)
Rule 609(a) provoked extensive legislative controversy.50 The rule
that was finally adopted was the result of a compromise. The ambiguity
of Rule 609(a) stems from a legislative oversight caused by an almost
exclusive focus on criminal trials, particularly in the Conference Com-
mittee that drafted the existing version of Rule 609(a). 11
The first draft of the Advisory Committee reflected the traditional
rule.52 The Committee soon issued a new draft with a balancing stan-
dard resembling that of Rule 403.53 This proposal was criticized as con-
trary to the intent Congress expressed the year before when it amended
46. See 10 J. Moore, supra note 10, § 609.01[l.-7], at VI-1 11 (citing Crime in the
National Capital Part 4: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the District of Columbia,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1396-97 (1969)).
47. See id.; 120 Cong. Rec. 2380 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hogan).
48. The Luck balancing approach was opposed by the Department of Justice and the
District of Columbia Bar Association. 10 J. Moore, supra note 10, § 609.01[l.-7], at VI-
110 to -12.
49. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
50. See Garnett v. Kepner, 541 F. Supp. 241, 244 (M.D. Pa. 1982); 3 D. Louisell & C.
Mueller, supra note 3, § 314, at 284; 10 J. Moore, supra note 10, § 609.02, at VI-134; S.
Saltzburg & K. Redden, supra note 8, at 364.
51. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
52. (a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the
crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false state-
ment regardless of the punishment.
46 F.R.D. 161, 295-96 (1969). The proposed rule gave judges no discretion to exclude
prior convictions. Although the Advisory Committee recognized the dangers inherent in
the use of such evidence, particularly when a criminal defendant is impeached, it felt that
exclusion was not justified, as the "[d]angers of unfair prejudice. . . tend to disappear or
diminish." See Rule 609(a) advisory committee note, 46 F.R.D. 161, 296-97 (1969). Ar-
guments that convictions for offenses other than crimen falsi are irrelelvant to credibility
were considered unconvincing. See id.
53. The Advisory Committee reconsidered the dangers it had previously found imma-
terial, and issued a new draft. See Rule 609(a) advisory committee note, 51 F.R.D. 315,
391-92 (1971) ("With these objections in mind, the Advisory Committee has incorpo-
rated in the proposed rule basic safeguards, in terms applicable to all witnessses but of
particular significance to the accused who elects to testify."). The new draft provided:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo con-
tendere, is admissible but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or im-
prisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment, un-
less (3), in either case, the judge determines that the probative value of the
evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.
51 F.R.D. at 391.
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the District of Columbia statute.5 4 Under heavy criticism," the Com-
mittee reissued its original proposal,5 6 as it would have been impolitic for
the Supreme Court to suggest Luck's revival. 7
The House Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws amended the bill to admit prior conviction evidence for impeach-
ment unless the dangers of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative
value of the conviction. However, citing concerns of relevance, undue
prejudice and the deterrent effect, particularly when a criminal defendant
is impeached, the House Committee on the Judiciary amended the bill to
permit admission only of prior convictions of crimen falsi."9
Although some Representatives recognized that the rule as adopted
would apply in both civil and criminal cases," the extensive floor debate
in the House focused almost entirely on criminal cases.61 Examples
given to illustrate concepts in the debates were mostly in the context of
criminal cases.62 The proposed rule's impact on criminal defendants was
the chief concern of both the proponents and opponents of the Commit-
54. Senator McClellan, then chairman of the Judiciary Committee, stated that the
proposal was "in fact a direct assault on the will of Congress as recently expressed" by
the rejection of Luck the year before. See 117 Cong. Rec. 29,894 (1971).
55. See id. The Advisory Committee claimed that it had been more guilty of over-
sight than of disrespect of Congress because it was unaware of Congress' rejection of
Luck. See Rules of Evidence. Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Fed-
eral Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., on Pro-
posed Rules of Evidence, Ser. No. 2, 29 (1973) (testimony of Prof. Cleary).
56. See 56 F.R.D. 183, 269-70 (1972). Thus, the proposal submitted to Congress was
the traditional rule as encompassed in the Advisory Committee's original draft. See
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
57. Note, Impeachment By Prior Conviction: Adjusting to Federal Rule of Evidence
609, supra note 45, at 421.
58. See H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 7075, 7084.
59. See id at 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7084-85.
60. See, e.g., 120 Cong. Rec. 2377 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dennis); id. at 2376 (re-
marks of Rep. Hogan); id. at 2379 (remarks of Rep. Wiggins); id, at 2381 (remarks of
Rep. Lott).
61. See id. at 2375-82. The debates were concerned mainly with the relevance of past
criminal activity to credibility, and the current proposal's effect on criminal trials. The
proponents of the proposal were led by Representative Dennis. They argued that the
undue prejudice resulting from the admission of irrelevant prior convictions conflicted
with the principle that a criminal defendant should not be convicted solely because he is
of bad character. See id. at 2377 (remarks of Rep. Dennis). Representative Dennis ar-
gued that a significant proportion of miscarriages of justice occur due to undue prejudice
or the deterrent effect. See id. Opponents of the Committee's view focused their con-
cerns almost exclusively on the proposal's impact on criminal trials. Led by Representa-
tive Hogan, they argued that the Committee's rule excluded evidence that was probative
of credibility. See id. at 2376, 2381 (remarks of Reps. Hogan & Lott). In addition, they
believed that the rule could allow a criminal defendant with a prior criminal history to
appear to have an unblemished record. See id. at 2376 (remarks of Rep. Hogan). They
also argued that the proposal denied a criminal defendant the opportunity to impeach a
government witness. See idi Furthermore, the proposal rejected the prevailing view, the
Advisory Committee's view and the mandate of Congress that had been expressed in the
rejection of Luck. Id at 2376-77 (remarks of Rep. Hogan).
62. See supra note 61.
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tee's view.63 Following the debate and the rejection of an amendment
that would have restored the Subcommittee's version,' the House voted
to accept the Committee's version.65
In the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, there was some discus-
sion of the use of impeachment evidence in civil cases, 66 which could be
interpreted as a recognition that the rule as developed would apply in all
cases. The Judiciary Committee rejected the House version of the bill
because it thought the dangers of unfair prejudice were far greater when
the witness was a criminal defendant.67 The Committee proposed a rule
whereby criminal defendants could be impeached only by prior convic-
tions of crimen falsi.6 s Prior convictions were admissible to impeach all
other witnesses only when the probative value of the evidence out-
weighed its prejudicial effect.69
The distinction between criminal defendants and other witnesses made
in the Committee's proposal apparently was not recognized during de-
bates on the Senate floor. Civil cases, and the impact of the various pro-
posed rules on those cases, went unmentioned.70 As in the House, the
debate focused on the effect of impeachment on criminal cases.7 The
Senate did not accept the recommendation of the Judiciary Committee,72
and instead adopted the version of the rule that the Supreme Court had
submitted to Congress.73
This almost exclusive concern with criminal cases was equally appar-
ent in the Conference Committee. Although no record preserves the
Committee's deliberations, several clues support this conclusion. A sig-
nificant number of the legislators on the Conference Committee 74 had
made statements that illustrated their apparent focus on the proposed
rule's application in criminal cases.75 In addition, the Committee report
63. See id.
64. Id. at 2375, 2381.
65. See id. at 2393-94.
66. See Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974).
67. See S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Cong.
Code & Ad. News 7051, 7060-61.
68. See id. at 14, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7060-61.
69. Id. at 14, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7060-61.
70. See 120 Cong. Rec. 37,076-80 (1974).
71. See id. Senator McClellan stated:
We have gone pretty far already in trying to protect criminals and granting
every advantage to them against society.... [This rule would deny the jury] the
right or the opportunity to weigh the testimony of the defendant in light of the
fact that the defendant is a convicted felon.
Id. at 37,076.
72. See id. at 37,075-76, 37,083.
73. See id.
74. The Conference Committee was comprised of Senators Eastland, McClellan,
Hart, Ervin, Burdick, Hruska, Thurmond and Scott; and Representatives Hungate, Kas-
tenmeier, Edwards, Smith and Dennis. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7098, 7107.
75. In discussing the balancing provision of the final version of Rule 609(a)(1), Repre-
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used words common to criminal trials, such as "defendant" instead of
"party, ' 76 and the verb "convict." 7 7 The Conference Committee deter-
mined that the prejudicial effect to be weighed against the probative
value of the conviction is "specifically the prejudicial effect to the defend-
ant.""8 Other dangers, such as embarrassment of witnesses, were not be-
lieved sufficient to warrant exclusion.79 The Conference Committee
stated that the need for the trier of fact to have information about the
credibility of a nondefendant witness outweighed the danger of unfair
prejudice.8s This reference to nondefendant witnesses apparently re-
ferred to prosecution witnesses in criminal trials."s
Although it was recognized that the rule as drafted would apply to
both civil and criminal cases, 2 it is clear that the balancing provision of
Rule 609(a) was intended only for criminal defendants.8 3
sentative Hungate stated, "The rule, in practical effect, means that in a criminal case the
prior felony conviction of a prosecution witness may always be used. There can be no
prejudicial effect to the defendant if he, the defendant, impeaches the credibility of a
presecution [sic] witness." 120 Cong. Rec. 40,891 (1974). Representative Dennis dis-
cussed the balancing provision of the final version of Rule 609(a)(1) by stating:
... [A] defendant can cross examine a government witness about any of his
previous felony convictions; he can always do it, because that will not prejudice
him in anyway [sic]. Only the Government is going to be limited; and now the
Government is going to have the burden of proof if it wants to go beyond cross-
examination about the type of crime which does in fact bear strictly on
credibility.
Id. at 40,894. For additional statements of Representative Dennis, see supra notes 60-61.
For relevant statements of Senator McClellan, see 120 Cong. Rec. 37,077 (1974) ("The
fact that a person has committed such a serious offense in the past clearly bears on
whether he would lie under oath where his life or liberty was in jeopardy."). See supra
note 71. Senator Hart's concerns focused on the criminal defendant's grievous dilemma.
See 120 Cong. Rec. 37,078-79 (1974). See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. The
remarks of Senators Hruska and Burdick also focused on criminal trials. See 120 Cong.
Rec. 37,077, 37,079 (1974).
76. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 7098, 7102-03. See infra note 111.
77. See id. at 9-10, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7098, 7102-03.
("Such evidence should only be excluded where it presents a danger of improperly influ-
encing the outcome of the trial by persuading the trier of fact to convict the defendant on
the basis of his prior criminal record.").
78. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7103. (emphasis in
original).
79. See id. at 10, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7103.
80. See id. at 10, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7103. ("It was
the judgment of the Conference that the danger of prejudice to a non defendant witness is
outweighed by the need for the trier of fact to have as much relevant evidence on the issue
of credibility as possible.").
81. See 120 Cong. Rec. 40,891 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hungate) ("[t]he rule...
means that in a criminal case the prior felony convictions of a prosecution witness may
always be used"); id. at 40,894 (remarks of Rep. Dennis) ("now a defendant can cross
examine a government witness about any of his previous felony convictions; he can al-
ways do it").
82. See supra notes 58, 66.
83. The balancing provision of Rule 609(a)(1) may also apply in civil habeas corpus




III. APPLICATION OF RULE 609(a)
The application of Rule 609(a)(1) in civil cases presents several
problems. The complexity of applying Rule 609(a) results not only from
the Conference Committee's poor drafting,8 4 but also from the conflict-
ing goals of the Rule." Rule 609(a) is designed to protect the innocent
by preventing undue prejudice8 6 and by reducing the deterrent effect that
discourages party witnesses from testifying.87 At the same time, Rule
609(a) is intended to protect the opposing party's case from misrepresen-
tation that a convicted witness has no prior record and that he can be
trusted.8 The result of these conflicting goals and the Conference Com-
mittee's poor drafting is that the Rule cannot be applied sensibly in civil
cases.
89
With the exception of the balancing provision, the entirety of Rule 609
applies to all witnesses in all proceedings in federal courts when evidence
of prior convictions is offered to impeach a witness' credibility. 90 When
prior convictions are offered for purposes other than impeachment, 91 ad-
mission is governed by the general balancing provisions of Rule 403.92
Rule 403 also governs the scope of the evidence admitted under Rule
609(a). 93
Unlike the traditional rule and Rule 403, the burden of proof under
84. See Moore v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919, 921 n.1 (D. Md. 1983)
(difficulty in applying Rule 609(a)(1) in civil cases may be result of legislative oversight).
The drafters of the Uniform Rules of Evidence apparently recognized the deficiency of
Rule 609. Compare Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1) with Unif. R. Evid. 609(a)(1) ("to the defend-
ant" replaced with "to a party or witness").
85. See United States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 942 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Weinstein,
J.); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, § 609[01], at 609-46.
86. See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
89. 10 J. Moore, supra note 10, § 609.14[41, at VI-148; see Moore v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919, 920 (D. Md. 1983) (Federal Rules of Evidence provide poor
guidance when prior convictions offered for impeachment purposes in civil cases).
90. See C. McCormick, supra note 3, § 43, at 94; 10 J. Moore, supra note 10,
§ 609.03, at VI-135-36.
91. Other purposes for admitting prior convictions include motive, identification and
corroboration of testimony. See, e.g., Roshan v. Fard, 705 F.2d 102, 104 (4th Cir. 1983)
(motive); Bowden v. McKenna, 600 F.2d 282, 284 (1st Cir.) (identification), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 899 (1979); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1346-47 (5th Cir. 1978)
(corroboration of testimony).
92. Roshan v. Fard, 705 F.2d 102, 104 (4th Cir. 1983); Bowden v. McKenna, 600
F.2d 282, 284 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573
F.2d 1332, 1346-47 (5th Cir. 1978).
93. See United States v. Phillips, 488 F. Supp. 508, 512-13 (W.D. Mo. 1980), modified
on other grounds, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982). Generally,
the scope is limited to the conviction itself, and the time and place of conviction. See
United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 670 n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (quoting
United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 246, 250 (7th Cir. 1972)); Phillips, 488 F. Supp. at 513.
The punishment received for the conviction is not admissible. See Sampol, 636 F.2d at
670. The purpose of this limitation is to avoid litigation of collateral issues. See Eastern
Renovating Corp. v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 554 F.2d 4, 7 (Ist Cir. 1977).
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Rule 609 is on the proponent of the evidence to demonstrate that its
probative value exceeds it prejudicial effect. 94 The court has broad dis-
cretion in its determination under the balancing test,95 and can be re-
versed only for abuse of that discretion.96
Rule 609(a) distinguishes between both the types of offered convic-
tions97 and types of witnesses. 98 For all witnesses, crimen falsi are auto-
matically admissible for impeachment purposes. 99 The court has no
discretion to exclude the evidence under either Rule 609(a)co or Rule
403.101 In criminal cases, convictions for felonies other than crimen falsi
94. See United States v. Hendershot, 614 F.2d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1980); 10 J. Moore,
supra note 10, § 609.14[3], at VI-147 to -48.
95. See Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 895 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815
(1983); Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352, 359 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. De La
Torre, 639 F.2d 245, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
The factors considered in the balancing process are similar to those that were applied
in the Luck balancing approach. They include the similarity of the prior conviction to
the crime charged, the remoteness in time of the prior conviction, the nature of the prior
crime and the importance of both the testimony and the issue of the witness' credibility.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text. See United States v. Hawley, 554 F.2d 50, 53
& n.5 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Jones v. Collier, 762 F.2d 71, 72 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1985). The
punishment received for the prior conviction is not a proper factor for consideration. See
United States v. Phillips, 488 F. Supp. 508, 514 & n.6 (W.D. Mo. 1980), modified on other
grounds, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982). The trial court may,
in its discretion, inquire into the background facts and circumstances. United States v.
Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Although Rule 609 does not require an in limine hearing to determine the admissibility
of prior convictions, a hearing is considered useful and makes the decision easier to re-
view. See United States v. Preston, 608 F.2d 626, 639 (5th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446
U.S. 940 (1980). An in limine hearing will also encourage a witness to testify by allowing
him to know in advance whether he will be impeached. See United States v. Jackson, 405
F. Supp. 938, 942 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). The trial judge must determine on the record
whether the probative value of the proffered evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect
before admitting the evidence. This ensures that he has taken the relevant considerations
into account. See Preston, 608 F.2d at 639.
96. United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Preston, 608 F.2d 626, 639 (5th Cir. 1979), cerl denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980); United
States v. Hawley, 554 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1977).
97. The distinction is between crimes involving dishonesty, Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2),
and felonies, Fed. K Evid. 609(a)(1).
98. The plain language of Rule 609(a) distinguishes between defendants and other
witnesses. Fed. RK Evid. 609(a). Prosecution witnesses are always subject to impeach-
ment. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
99. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2).
100. The plain language of Rule 609(a)(2) gives no indication of any discretion to ex-
clude prior convictions of crimes involving dishonesty. Id.; see United States v. Kuecker,
740 F.2d 496, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65, 66-67 (3d Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 842 (1983); United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349,
353 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Leyva, 659 F.2d 118, 121-22 (9th Cir. 1981), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982); United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277, 278, 280 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 985 (1980); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 365 (D.C. Cir.
1976); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 7098, 7103.
101. See United States v. Kuecker, 740 F.2d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Wong, 703 F.2d 65, 67-68 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 842 (1983);
United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 354 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Leyva, 659
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are admissible subject to the balancing test of Rule 609(a).'° 2 This bal-
ancing test may also be employed to exclude a conviction of a defense
witness in a criminal case when the balance indicates it is appropriate.10 3
Prior convictions offered to impeach prosecution witnesses may never be
excluded under Rule 609(a) because no prejudice to the defendant would
result."° To be admitted, however, these convictions must satisfy the
other subdivisions of Rule 609.105
Both the legislative history of Rule 609(a) and an analysis of its appli-
cation reveal that the balancing provision of Rule 609(a) was intended
only for criminal defendants. The balancing test of Rule 609(a) is much
more exclusionary than that of Rule 403.106 This departure from the
general balancing test of Rule 403 can be justified only by the special
needs of criminal defendants.10 7 A stringent balancing test effectively
reduces undue prejudice from prior conviction evidence.
In addition, literal application of the Rule in civil cases would result in
a differentiation between the parties. 108 Although it has been held that
the plain language of Rule 609(a) requires the balancing test to be ap-
plied in all cases,109 logic dictates the opposite. The words "to the de-
fendant" suggest reference to a criminal defendant." 0 As contrasted
with criminal trials, there is no reason to differentiate between the parties
F.2d 118, 122 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982); United States v. Toney,
615 F.2d 277, 279-80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 985 (1980). But see United States
v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079, 1083 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976) (dictum) (in some cases, trial court
may have discretion to exclude prior conviction evidence under Rule 403).
102. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a). See infra notes 106-13.
103. See S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, supra note 8, at 520; 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
supra note 1, § 609[05], at 609-81.
104. See 120 Cong. Rec. 40,894 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dennis); id. at 40,891 (re-
marks of Rep. Hungate); see also United States v. Martin, 562 F.2d 673, 680 n. 16 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (dictum); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 359 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(prosecution witnesses may be impeached by prior convictions subject to protection from
harassment).
105. The other subdivisions of Rule 609 refer to a ten-year age limit in proffered prior
convictions, see Fed. R. Evid. 609(b), the effect of pardon or annulment, see Fed. R. Evid.
609(c), the handling of juvenile adjudications, see Fed. R. Evid. 609(d), and convictions
subject to a pending appeal, see Fed. R. Evid. 609(e).
106. Compare Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1) (evidence admitted only if its probative value
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant) with Fed. R. Evid. 403 (evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect). Thus,
the burden of proof in the Rule 609(a) balancing is on the proponent of the impeachment
evidence, while the burden in the Rule 403 balancing is placed on the opponent of the
evidence. C. McCormick, supra note 3, § 43, at 94 n.9.
107. See Moore v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919, 920-22 (D. Md. 1983);
Tussel v. Witco Chem. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979, 983 (W.D. Pa. 1983); S. Saltzburg & K.
Redden, supra note 8, at 520.
108. See 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 3, § 316, at 324 n.26; see also S.
Saltzburg & K. Redden, supra note 8, at 520 ("impeachment has always been a two way
street").
109. See Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 581-82 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2157 (1985).
110. See Moore v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 575 F. Supp. 919, 921 (D. Md. 1983)
(phrase "to the defendant" suggests that the rule is designed for criminal trials).
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in civil cases.' One court held that unless amended, Rule 609(a) should
be applied literally in civil cases, despite possible "bizarre results" in fu-
ture cases.1 2  Congress intended the balancing provision to apply in
criminal trials only." 3 Therefore, the proper treatment of prior convic-
tions offered to impeach witnesses in civil cases must be determined.
This requires analysis of whether such convictions are automatically ad-
missible or whether the general balancing provision of Rule 403 applies
when a civil party offers prior convictions to impeach its opponent's
witnesses. 1
4
IV. APPLICATION OF RULE 403 TO CIVIL TRIALS
The central issue in determining whether Rule 403 can be applied in
civil cases is whether the more specific Rule 609 preempts Rule 403 in
the civil context." 5 Courts disagree on this issue. 1 6 A statutory provi-
sion that applies to a specific situation will usually preempt a more gen-
eral rule that would otherwise apply." 7 Thus Rule 403 should apply
when no specific rule covers the issue under consideration." 8 As dis-
cussed above, the Rule 609(a) balancing test applies only to criminal de-
fendants. "' Because Rule 609 offers no test for balancing probative
value against prejudicial effect in civil cases, Rule 403 should be applied
to prevent possible unfair prejudice.
Moreover, examination of the principles governing the application of
Rule 403 demonstrates that its balancing test is better suited for civil
111. 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 3, § 316, at 324 n.26.
112. Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 582 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 2157
(1985) ("mandatory admission of all felony convictions ... may in some cases produce
unjust and even bizarre results"). Diggs involved prior convictions offered to impeach a
civil plaintiff. The question of whether prior convictions offered to impeach a civil de-
fendant would be subject to the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing process was not resolved. See
iL at 577-82. Literal application of Rule 609(a) in civil cases would also produce even
more bizarre results. Prior convictions offered to impeach a civil defendant would be
subject to the balancing process, while those convictions offered against civil plaintiffs
would be automatically admitted. See Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1).
113. See supra notes 50-83 and accompanying text.
114. Most of the courts that have addressed this issue have framed their inquiry in
terms of whether Rule 403 can be used. See cases discussed supra note 3.
115. See cases discussed supra note 3.
116. See supra note 7.
117. IA N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.16, at 373-74 (C. Sands 4th
rev. ed. 1985).
118. See id. The Advisory Committee note to Rule 403 provides that:
The rules which follow in this Article are concrete applications evolved for
particular situations. However, they reflect the policies underlying the present
rule, which is designed as a guide for the handling of situations for which no
specific rules have been formulated.
Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee note. This quote apparently refers only to the
rules in Article IV. However, the Advisory Committee note has been cited for this point
in connection with the relationship of Rule 403 to Rule 609(a). See United States v.
Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 354 (1st Cir. 1981).
119. See supra notes 50-83 and accompanying text.
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trials than the balancing test of Rule 609(a). The added protection af-
forded to criminal defendants in Rule 609(a) is unnecessary in civil tri-
als.1 20 Rule 403 favors admission of relevant evidence. 121 Although the
court has considerable discretion in the application of Rule 403,122 that
discretion should be used sparingly. 23 Before relevant evidence is ex-
cluded, other alternatives, such as limiting instructions, should be
considered. 124
Applying Rule 403 in civil cases conforms with the principles of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 125 The thrust of the Rules is that probative
evidence should not be excluded absent compelling reasons. 126 When ex-
clusion is necessary, Rule 403 can be used to exclude unduly prejudicial
prior conviction evidence in a civil case. By preventing undue prejudice,
and the possible deterrent effect resulting from fear of undue prejudice,
this application of Rule 403 will further the cause of justice in civil cases
by advancing accuracy and fairness through judicial flexibility.12 7
CONCLUSION
An analysis of both the legislative history and practical application of
Rule 609(a)(1) demonstrates that the Rule's balancing provision was in-
tended to apply only to criminal defendants. In civil cases, the admission
of prior conviction evidence offered for impeachment should be governed
120. See S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, supra note 8, at 520 (special protection of Rule
609(a)(1) intended to protect only criminal defendant).
121. See 10 J. Moore, supra note 10, § 403.02[3], at IV-69 to -73; S. Saltzburg & K.
Redden, supra note 8, at 138, see also I J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, § 403[2],
at 403-17 ("Rule 403 should be applied infrequently and cautiously by trial judges"); 1 J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 10A, at 680 (P. Tillers rev. ed. 1983) (need for exclusion must be
clear as exclusion is a drastic remedy).
122. See, e.g., Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1242 (11th Cir. 1985); Noel Shows,
Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 327, 329 (11 th Cir. 1983); Stallworth v. Illinois Cent. Gulf
R.R., 690 F.2d 858, 868 (11 th Cir. 1982); 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 3, § 125,
at 8-27.
123. See Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1242 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Ebanks v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 688 F.2d 716, 722-23 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1083 (1983); 2 S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, supra note 8, at 139 (balance maximum proba-
tive value against likely prejudical effect); 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1,
§ 403[01], at 403-7.
124. Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee note; 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra
note 1, § 403[01], at 403-8.
125. Fed. R. Evid 102; see also Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on
the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 Wash. L. Rev. 497, 499 (1983) (Rule 403
intended to advance accuracy and fairness through judicial flexibility). See infra notes
126-27 and accompanying text.
126. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983); United States v. Dennis, 625
F.2d 782, 797 (8th Cir. 1980); 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 1, § 403[02], at
403-17. But see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1141-
42 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (do not err on side of admission).
127. See Fed. R. Evid. 102 ("These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in ad-
ministration. . . and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the
end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."). See supra
note 125.
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by the less exclusionary balancing provision of Rule 403. This approach
excludes prior conviction evidence that is probative of credibility only
when there is a substantial likelihood of undue prejudice. This result
comports with the principles of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
intent of Congress.
James McMahon

